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Assembling a powerful corpus 
of research and theory, Amanda 
Boetzkes argues in The Ethics of 
Earth Art that earth art provides a 
sensible surface upon which sub-
jects can form an ethical relation-
ship to the earth based on its radical 
alterity to the body. Boetzkes’s book 
is of major importance to artists, 
historians, and ecophilosophers, 
but its methodology and dense 
academic presentation make such 
strenuous demands that I consider 
the workings of this ethical rela-
tionship to be far from settled.
Boetzkes begins by defining 
an ecological stance as that which 
“involves revealing the limits of 
an anthropocentric worldview and 
recognizing these limits as thresh-
olds to the excess of the earth” (3). 
Ecological ethics commonly revolve 
around human ecology; Boetzkes 
quickly separates her project from 
anthropocentric ethics, focusing 
instead on the place where “nature 
exceeds the scope of human knowl-
edge and systems of representa-
tion” (3). Boetzkes notes that, since 
the 1960s, artists have initiated an 
ethical engagement with the earth 
and its ecology to offer a surface 
upon which viewers can access the 
“elemental.” The artwork reveals 
how elementals overwhelm the 
senses, “and specifically how nature 
troubles representational form” (4). 
The simultaneous aesthetic excess 
and withdrawal from representa-
tion create “the conditions of pos-
sibility for the earth to appear at 
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subjects open into and onto the 
other, “through an open and recep-
tive mode of touch that does not 
attempt to enclose but reinforces 
the parameters of difference” (21). 
Earth art, Boetzkes argues, pro-
vides a medium through which the 
human subject develops a similar 
ethical position by sensing the radi-
cal otherness of the earth.
Fundamental to Boetzkes’s 
project is John Sallis’s philosophy of 
the elemental. Boetzkes interprets 
the elemental as “irreducible”: “An 
elemental cannot be analyzed by 
dividing it into constituent parts, 
nor can it be summarized as a single 
entity” (15). Unable to “deliver [an 
elemental’s] sensual fullness” (20), 
contemporary artists struggle “to 
make the earth visible” (18) while 
revealing “its resistance to signifi-
cation” (18). Boetzkes, therefore, 
distinguishes between the earth (for 
Edmund Husserl, the Ur-Arche), 
which defies representability, and 
the linguistically, culturally, and 
historically inscribed world.
Chapter 2 submits Robert 
Smithson’s work as evidence that 
earth art insists on the unrepre-
sentability of the site. Boetzkes 
draws attention to the way that 
Smithson’s Spiral Jetty (1970), an 
artwork that exists in diverse docu-
mentary and material forms, con-
joins vision and language. To do so, 
she retraces the arguments of Craig 
Owens’s influential essay, in which 
the latter argued that the totality 
of Spiral Jetty always exceeds any 
the limits of intelligible form and to 
deliver a sense of it at the point at 
which it overflows the field of per-
ception” (4). The perceiver is thus 
put into a relationship with the 
earth that Boetzkes will character-
ize as marked by recessive ethics (4).
Defined as “a stance of retrac-
tion from and receptivity to the 
earth,” the recessive ethics that 
figure in contemporary art com-
bat two misguided relationships 
towards the earth (4). According to 
the “instrumental view,” humans 
mine the earth’s resources strictly 
to reproduce an anthropocentric 
hegemony. Equally problematic, 
the “romantic view” imagines a 
“return to a state of unencumbered 
continuity with nature” (4). The 
encounter with earth art frustrates 
both instrumental and roman-
tic views by proffering an already 
withdrawn earth. As a recessive 
other, the earth’s relationship to 
the artgoer is likened to the ethi-
cal relationship between a subject 
and his sexual other, which luce 
Irigaray outlines in An Ethics of 
Sexual Difference (1993). Boetzkes 
identifies two characteristics of 
Irigaray’s ethics of difference as 
particularly important to the eth-
ics of earth art. Irigaray’s ethics 
are driven by a problematic that 
is born only when one recognizes 
the other’s sexual difference and 
ponders their irreducible, inter-
stitial distance. Crucial to this rec-
ognition is the physical encounter 
with the other, through which both 
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Boetzkes writes, “To posit the earth 
as elemental is to insist on its irre-
ducibility to the human world and 
to distinguish it from a bounded 
and intelligible thing” (102). Since 
elementals are boundless, they are 
not intelligible; they are neverthe-
less sensible (102). As a result, the 
elemental earth raises the ethical 
opportunity “for a reconceptualiza-
tion of the earth itself and of our 
position in relation to it” (103).
Turning to Martin Heidegger 
and Jean-luc Nancy, Boetzkes 
investigates the ways that humans 
define the earth in terms of its natu-
ral resources.1 She invokes Nancy’s 
term, “ecotechnology,” to remind 
us that “the discourses that frame 
nature are inseparable from a set 
of technological conditions that are 
produced for us and by us” (104). 
(Nancy developed the term to qual-
ify Foucault’s contention that, from 
the eighteenth century, political 
regimes exercised power over insti-
tutions related to the preservation 
of the organism and the species.2 
Nancy clarified that “biopolitics” 
became possible only because of the 
scientific ability to automanage life 
through technology, what he called 
“ecotechnology.”3) Boetzkes states, 
“Thus, ecotechnology exposes the 
earth as resource, but it also brings 
forth the idea of nature, or the 
‘truth’ of the elemental earth” (104). 
This leads Boetzkes to agree with 
Sallis that “the turn to the elemen-
tal is not a move ‘back to nature,’” 
but a turn towards that which 
single documentary record (e.g., 
a photograph or a film). Owens 
determines that the work exists 
allegorically, with narratives retro-
spectively supplementing the lim-
its of any one particular document. 
Unlike Owens, Boetzkes does 
not focus on the space or distance 
between the site and its discursive 
supplements. Rather, she insists 
that the “gaps in signification that 
occur between the texts” serve to 
make the site’s unrepresentability 
(the “empty center in the artwork”) 
its ethical purpose: “The statement 
is not just that the site is absent 
but that its totality is not, and 
never was, possible” (72). Crucial 
to Boetzkes’s understanding of 
Spiral Jetty is her belief that textu-
ality does not render phenomenal 
experience unnecessary. On the 
contrary, the physical encounter 
with elementals plays a constitu-
tive role in establishing the ethical 
relationship. By overwhelming the 
senses, elementals remind the sub-
ject of the earth’s irreducibility and, 
therefore, of its otherness. This 
does not distance the site through 
allegory, but recovers for the site its 
real fullness (91). Bringing earth, 
water, and light together achieves 
for Boetzkes an “intertwining of 
elementals,” and “[t]hrough this 
overlap of elementals, Spiral Jetty 
demonstrates the earth’s impen-
etrability and its resistance to unifi-
cation of form and meaning” (101).
Chapter 3 more thoroughly 
revisits the earth as “elemental.” 
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empathy because he cannot recog-
nize the existence of others.
Ultimately, Boetzkes argues that 
earth art positions the subject “at 
the very site where elementals 
meet, overlap, and drawback from 
one another” (115). The elemental 
“overflows” establish the relation-
ship between the subject and the 
excessive earth as analogous to 
Irigaray’s relationship between eth-
ical subject (constituted as male in 
Western philosophy) and his femi-
nine other as constituted through 
an irreducible sexual difference. 
Irigaray understands that sexual 
difference exists in registers beyond 
the strictly visual, and she posits a 
central role for tactility in recogniz-
ing the other. likewise, Boetzkes 
extends this tactility to the earth art 
encounter:
[T]he entanglement of tactil-
ity and vision are key to the 
ethical paradigm of earth 
art. These senses are each 
provoked, suspended, and 
reestablished through one 
another, as a means of elicit-
ing a “facing” of the earth. . . . 
Though the body is located 
in a network of natural activ-
ity, then, the artworks insti-
gate an involution or turn 
against the earth in order 
to gain a perspective of it as 
other. (147)
This point of contact constitutes 
the defining (and deconstructive) 
exceeds the instrumentally condi-
tioned frame of nature (104).
Artists like James Turrell, Chris 
Drury, and Olafur Eliasson create 
the opportunity to sense the elemen-
tal and thus to look at the face of the 
earth beyond ecotechnological con-
straints. These artists “use the art-
work to articulate an involution in, 
and a turn to face, the earth in order 
to extricate the spectator from the 
presumed continuity between the 
body and ‘nature’” (105). Boetzkes 
continues, “That is to say, by pre-
senting the elemental as a surface, 
contemporary artists open contact 
with the Earth’s alterity” (107).
The final half of the book exam-
ines what it means to face the earth 
ethically, emphasizing the funda-
mental role of alterity in that rela-
tionship. Boetzkes follows Irigaray, 
who repeatedly faults Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
for maintaining a bodily continu-
ity with the world; this narcissis-
tic continuity prevents the subject 
from recognizing its other, conse-
quently inhibiting meaningful ethi-
cal thought. Boetzkes explains, “All 
sensation becomes translated into 
‘Sameness’ and merely fulfills one’s 
perceptual expectations, so that no 
true understanding of difference 
can register” (108). For Irigaray, 
the recognition of the other is the 
requisite precondition that allows a 
subject to ask after the well-being 
of another. Without differentia-
tion, the subject remains sutured 
to a solipsistic world, incapable of 
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anthropocentrism  characteristic 
of an ecotechnological stance, 
Boetzkes insists that the earth is con-
stituted as radically other—that is, 
“not as a human subject.” Irigaray’s 
ethics are necessarily anthropomor-
phic and are also theorized around 
specific sexual difference. It is pre-
cisely sexual difference (rather 
than gender difference or abstract 
“Otherness”) that makes Irigaray’s 
ethics so complex, contentious, and 
revolutionary. Judith Butler notes 
that what is often identified as sex-
ual essentialism in Irigaray’s work 
might actually form one of its most 
potent challenges to masculinist 
philosophy: “[I]t’s clear to me that 
sexual difference does not denote a 
simple opposition, a binary opposi-
tion. What it denotes is something 
like the relationship of a presumed 
masculine symbolic order to what 
it must exclude and how that same 
presumed masculine order requires 
this excluded feminine to augment 
and reproduce itself.”5 Drucilla 
Cornell confirms the constitutive 
role of the feminine for Irigaray’s 
ethics:
If anything, the feminine 
was a kind of radical other-
ness to any conception of the 
real or reality. More than 
anything else, here I found 
someone who was deploying 
the feminine unashamedly 
in a utopian manner, say-
ing that there is a beyond to 
whatever kind of concept of 
limit against which the ethical 
relationship is forged. In her dis-
cussions of Ana Mendieta, Jackie 
Brookner, and Ichi Ikeda, among 
others, Boetzkes concludes that 
this “understanding of the artwork 
as founded on a sensorial encoun-
ter implies that the earth is not just 
the material of the artwork, or 
even its catalyst, but an unfathom-
able presence engaged in a kind 
of quasi-intersubjective exchange 
with the artist. . . . The artwork 
entails a facing of the earth as a 
radical other, not as a human sub-
ject” (160, my emphasis).
While I greatly admire the 
aims of this project, I am con-
cerned about the overall approach 
to methodology, an approach that 
I can only understand as a kind of 
bricolage. It is not that Boetzkes 
borrows theories from such an 
extensive roster of diverse, often 
antithetical philosophers that elic-
its alarm. Rather, in the bricolage 
forms these philosophies assume 
in her monograph, aspects that I 
consider to be essential components 
of the original are often missing or 
at least unnoticeable in Boetzkes’s 
deployment. I will focus here on 
one example: the disappearance 
of sex from Irigaray’s ethics of 
difference.4
What is missing in Boetzkes’s 
application (though not her dis-
cussion) of an ethics of sexual dif-
ference to the ethics of earth art 
is the irreplaceable centrality of 
sexual difference. To avoid the 
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of An Ethics of Sexual Difference, 
which “is all about mom and moth-
erhood and not at all about post-
family arrangements or alternative 
family arrangements.”8 For Butler, 
Irigaray
not only brought to the fore 
a kind of presumptive het-
erosexuality, but actually 
made heterosexuality into 
the privileged locus of ethics, 
as if heterosexual  relations, 
because they putatively 
crossed this alterity, which is 
the alterity of sexual differ-
ence, were somehow more 
ethical, more other-directed, 
less  narcissistic than  anything 
else.9
This heterocentrism persists in the 
ethics of earth art, which similarly 
privileges the intact surface of dif-
ference between subject and the 
earth as the locus of the ethical 
encounter. Butler continues, “And 
I would say that what [Irigaray] 
has done has completely obliter-
ated the way in which an ethi-
cally enabling difference exists in 
homosexual love.”10 Boetzkes has 
brought together a provocative 
combination of phenomenologi-
cal and deconstructive texts that, 
as Cornell says of Irigaray, creates 
openings in which we may com-
pletely rethink our relationship to 
the earth. This book initiates what 
will surely continue as a lively, 
unsettled debate over our ethical 
sense we have. And without 
that beyond being articu-
lated, endlessly breaking up 
the real, we can’t even get to 
a different kind of ethics. I 
saw her as creating openings, 
not just a feminist ethics, but 
an ethics in which the femi-
nine within sexual difference 
was crucial to a complete 
rethinking of the ethical.6
I understand that even considering 
the figure of Mother Earth intro-
duces what could be construed as 
anthropocentric essentialism, but 
Butler urges us to consider essen-
tialism more deeply: “But still it’s 
very interesting that essentialism 
has been collapsed with categories 
that describe adequately when, in 
fact, what an essence is is something 
that is always escaping the domain 
of appearance.”7 Maintaining an 
interest in the feminine earth need 
not replicate a restrictive cliché; it 
may actually work in consonance 
with Boetzkes’s recessive ethics. 
By desexing the earth, The Ethics 
of Earth Art denies the utopian 
dimension of Irigaray’s ethics. The 
book also denies the feminine its 
potential as a viable alternative to 
the unmarked patriarchy normal-
ized in most ecophilosophy.
Desexing the ethics of earth art 
threatens further consequences: it 
masks the fundamental heterocen-
trism that is more readily apparent 
in Irigaray’s ethics. Butler worries 
about the extreme heterocentrism 
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2. Jean-luc Nancy, The Creation of the 
World or Globalization (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2007), 
93–95. Unfortunately, the central role 
of politics and power in Nancy’s text 
remains unacknowledged in Boetzkes’s 
discussion.
3. Ibid.
4. I would like to comment also on 
Boetzkes’s extraction of the elemental 
from Sallis’s complex philosophy but 
am unqualified to do so at length. I 
suspect that excising the elemental from 
the complex network of ideas such as 
the tractive imagination, the monstrous, 
and the exorbitant does something to 
the relationality of that term (see John 
Sallis, Force of Imagination, Studies in 
Continental Thought [Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2000]). Since 
Sallis himself considers the relationship 
of art to the earth, I wonder whether 
The Ethics of Earth Art could have been 
more convincingly staged from within 
Sallis’s paradigm.
5. Pheng Cheah and Elizabeth 
Grosz, “The Future of Sexual 
Difference: An Interview with Judith 
Butler and Drucilla Cornell,” Diacritics 
28, no. 1 (1998): 19–42, quotation on 27.
6. Ibid., 20.
7. Ibid., 22.
8. Ibid., 28.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
stance towards the earth. In future 
discussions, Drucilla Cornell’s 
Philosophy of the Limit (1992) 
may provide a valuable direc-
tion. Cornell shows that Jacques 
Derrida’s philosophy of reading 
allows us to rethink the ethics of 
difference. Rather than facing the 
earth, “reading” the Earth may 
provide a fruitful avenue through 
which an ethics of earth art that 
attends to sameness and differ-
ence, presence and absence, might 
be discerned.
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NOTES
1. It seems, though, that any instrumen-
tally conceived earth is not appro-
priately called “earth,” but perhaps 
“world.”
